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 HOW TRIBE AND STATE COOPERATIVE 
AGREEMENTS CAN SAVE THE ADAM WALSH ACT 
FROM ENCROACHING UPON TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
President George W. Bush signed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006 (AWA) into law on July 27, 2006.
1
  Congress passed the 
AWA to expand the national sex offender registry, strengthen federal 
penalties for crimes against children, and prevent sexual predators from 
reaching children on the internet.
2
  To achieve these purposes, the AWA 
requires that states, territories, and Indian tribes maintain sex offender 
registration and notification programs; punishes those sex offenders who fail 




Although the AWA has inspired growing academic dialogue since its 
enactment in 2006,
4
 it has inspired little academic criticism on behalf of 
American Indian tribes.
5
  Indian tribes have challenged that section 127
6
 of 
the AWA encroaches upon existing federal Indian law and policy promoting 
tribal sovereignty.
7
  On one hand, ―non-Public Law 280 tribes‖8 have argued 
 
1. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 
(2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901).  The AWA honors John and Reve Walsh for their 
dedication to the well-being and safety of America‘s children and marks the 25th anniversary of the 
abduction and murder of their son, Adam Walsh.  Id. § 2. 
2. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-7.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
3. Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 111(a), 112, 113, 117, 504, 120 Stat. at 593–94, 629 (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–13, 16917; 18 U.S.C. § 3509).  The sex offender registration and notification 
requirements constitute the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).  § 101, 120 
Stat. at 190 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901). 
4. See, e.g., Lara Geer Farley, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First 
Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471 (2008); Caitlin Young, Note, Children Sex Offenders: How the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act Hurts the Same Children it is Trying to Protect , 34 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 459 (2008). 
5. A review of law review articles that have discussed the AWA revealed only two articles that 
have discussed the AWA as related to Indian tribes.  See Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native 
American Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 794 n.414 (2008); James Park 
Taylor, Bespeaking Justice: A History of Indigent Defense in Montana, 68 MONT. L. REV. 363, 410 
(2007). 
6. § 127, 120 Stat. at 599 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16927). 
7. See, e.g., The Nat‘l Cong. of Am. Indians, Urging Congress to Amend Section 127 of the 
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that the AWA threatens to encroach upon tribal sovereignty because tribes 
must retrocede sex offender registration and notification responsibilities 
where they fail to comply with the AWA.
9
  On the other hand, ―Public Law 
280 tribes‖ have argued that the AWA extends beyond the scope of 
criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction delegated to states 
under Public Law 280.
10
  Furthermore, tribes have argued that Congress 
passed the AWA without any tribal input.
11
 
This Comment proposes that because the AWA threatens the tribal 
sovereignty of both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes, Congress 
should amend the AWA to require tribe and state cooperative agreements to 
carry out AWA sex offender registration and notification functions. 
Part II examines the development of tribal sovereignty as qualified by the 
federal trust relationship.  It addresses current federal and state criminal and 
civil jurisdiction over Indian country, which qualify tribal sovereignty in the 
name of the federal trust relationship.  It concludes by discussing Public Law 
280, which delegated to several states criminal/prohibitory and 
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian country and severely qualified tribal 
sovereignty in the name of the federal trust relationship. 
Part III examines both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes‘ 
argument that the AWA encroaches upon current federal Indian law and 
policy promoting tribal sovereignty.  Part III suggests that the AWA threatens 
tribal sovereignty in non-Public Law 280 states because the AWA may 
retrocede sex offender registration and notification responsibilities to the state, 
where non-Public Law 280 tribes fail to comply with the AWA‘s 
requirements.  It recognizes, however, that section 127 does not extend 
beyond the scope of criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction 
delegated to states over Public Law 280 tribes, where courts construe the 
AWA registration provisions as a criminal/prohibitory law.  Nonetheless, Part 
III suggests that the federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause 
challenges to the AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law, 
does support Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends 
beyond the scope of jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280. 
 
Adam Walsh Act,  Res. #ECWS-07-003 (Feb. 26, 2007), 
http://ncai.org/ncai/resource/documents/governance/Adam_Walsh_Act/07-003_Adam_Walsh.pdf 
[hereinafter NCAI Resolution]. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 53–64 (explaining Public Law 280). 
9. Sarah Deer, Widening the Gap: Adam Walsh Act Raises Concerns, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, Mar. 28, 2007, at A3. 
10. Id.; see also NCAI Resolution, supra note 7. 
11. The NCAI notes, ―[The AWA] addresses Indian tribes and was included without any 
hearings, consultation or consideration of the views of tribal governments and current tribal 
practices.‖  NCAI Resolution, supra note 7. 
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Part IV proposes that Congress should consider amending section 127 of 
the AWA to (1) strike the provision that unilaterally delegates sex offender 
registration and notification responsibilities to Public Law 280 states and (2) 
require that both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes and states 
adopt cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration and 
notification programs that comply with the AWA.  Part IV encourages 
Congress to follow the footsteps of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) and again resolve tribe and state jurisdictional conflict by requiring 
cooperative agreements.  It suggests that amending section 127 would permit 
tribes and states to develop ―custom-fit‖ sex offender registration and 
notifications programs that comply with AWA.  It concludes in suggesting 
that amending section 127 would ultimately promote current federal Indian 
law and policy promoting tribal sovereignty. 
II.  TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AS QUALIFIED BY THE FEDERAL TRUST 
RELATIONSHIP 
Part II examines the development of tribal sovereignty as qualified by the 
federal trust relationship.  Subpart A examines the roots of tribal sovereignty 
and the federal trust relationship.  Subpart B examines current federal and 
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country, which qualify tribal 
sovereignty in the name of the federal trust relationship.  Subpart C discusses 
Public Law 280, which delegated to several states criminal/prohibitory and 
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian country and greatly qualified tribal 
sovereignty in the name of the federal trust relationship. 
A.  The Roots of Tribal Sovereignty and the Federal Trust Relationship 
From as far back as 1787, Indian tribes have been concerned with 
protecting their tribal sovereignty from federal and state encroachment.
12
  
Broadly speaking, sovereignty is ―[s]upreme dominion, authority, or rule.‖13  
Specifically, sovereignty includes the recognition by others as a sovereign, a 
land base, the power of self-defense, a treaty-making power, an economic 
system, and the lack of subordination to other sovereigns.
14
  However, tribal 
sovereignty is qualified sovereignty—it yields to the plenary power of 
Congress and, in turn, the federal trust relationship.
15
  To date, tribes‘ right to 
 
12. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE 
ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 6 (3d ed. 2004). 
13. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004). 
14. See PEVAR, supra note 12, at 12–13. 
15. PEVAR, supra note 12, at 32 (As originally conceived by the United States Supreme Court, 
the federal trust relationship constitutes the bargain between tribes and the U.S. government—in 
exchange for millions of acres of tribal land, the government promised to provide tribes protection; 
respect; and food, clothing, and services.); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); 
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determine tribal membership is the only tribal sovereignty attribute 
consistently upheld in federal Indian law and policy.
16
  Nonetheless, since the 




Qualified tribal sovereignty dates to early nineteenth century United States 
Supreme Court decisions.
18
  In just over ten years, Chief Justice John 
Marshall penned what federal Indian law scholars commonly refer to as ―The 
Marshall Trilogy‖:19 Johnson v. M’Intosh,20 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,21 
and Worcester v. Georgia.
22
  These three decisions would become the 
foundation for qualified tribal sovereignty.
23
 
Johnson v. M’Intosh did not speak directly to the notion of tribal 
sovereignty, but it established Indian Title or Aboriginal Title, the right to 
occupy lands from ―time immemorial.‖24  As ―Court[] of the conqueror,‖ the 
Supreme Court encroached upon a primary attribute of tribal sovereignty, 




Cherokee Nation v. Georgia resembled Marbury v. Madison,
26
 which 
avoided eroding the legitimacy of the Supreme Court by refusing to hear the 
petitioner‘s writ of mandamus27 and established an enduring principle of 
federal Indian policy that limits tribal sovereignty—the federal trust 
relationship.
28
 Marshall declined to hear the Cherokee Nation‘s bill ―praying 
 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
16. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
17. PEVAR, supra note 12, at 12–13; see, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 
(1987) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (―[A] proper respect both for 
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area [providing a federal 
forum for civil actions against tribal officers] cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear 
indications of legislative intent.‖) (alterations in original). 
18. See WILLIAM CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 72 (4th ed. 2004). 
19.  Droske, supra note 5, at 728; Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme 
Court’s Changing Stance on Tribal Sovereignty, COMPLEAT LAW., Fall 1995, at 14, 15. 
20. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
21. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
23. See, e.g., Droske, supra note 5, at 728; Prygoski, supra note 19. 
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 549–50. 
25. Id. at 588; see, e.g., Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942) (holding 
that fishing and hunting rights are inherent with a ―right of occupancy‖ or Indian title).  But see Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (holding that Indian title does not create rights 
against taking or extinction by the United States subject to a right of compensation). 
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
27. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–80; WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE 
ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 70 (2000). 
28. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
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[for] an injunction restraining the state of Georgia from the execution of 
certain laws . . . [alleged] to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society.‖29  
He also rejected the argument that tribes were foreign states in the sense of the 
Constitution but recognized tribes as ―domestic dependent nations‖ whose 
―relation to the United States [resembled] that of a ward to his guardian.‖30 
Although Cherokee Nation denied the tribes‘ injunction request, it 
established the two sides of the ―federal trust relationship‖ coin.  On one side, 
Marshall held that tribes were subject to federal government authority as the 
―ward to his guardian.‖31  On the other side, Marshall held that the federal 
government had a responsibility of pupilage and guardianship.
32
  Thus, the 




Worcester v. Georgia built upon the federal trust relationship coin that 
Marshall established in Cherokee Nation and embraced tribal sovereignty 
against state encroachment.
34
  Here, Marshall used the federal trust 
relationship and an exclusive right to engage in commerce to justify federally 
regulated intercourse with Indian nations as ―distinct political communities.‖35  
Marshall therefore held that ―the laws of Georgia can have no force‖ within 
the Cherokee Nation.
36
  In sum, Worcester bolstered tribal sovereignty to 
protect tribes from state control and solidified qualified tribal sovereignty as 
subject to the authority of the federal government as conqueror.
37
 
In addition to ―The Marshall Trilogy,‖ two other cases have expanded 
upon the notion of qualified tribal sovereignty. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 
demonstrated the extent of Congress‘s power over tribes.38  In particular, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress‘s power over tribes is plenary, subject to a 
presumption of good faith, and ultimately non-judiciable to the extent of 
preempting inquiry into fraudulent misrepresentations leading to the 
extinction of tribal land.
39
  Additionally, Williams v. Lee established the 
―infringement test‖ that governed the scope of state action and interference 
 
29. Id. at 15. 
30. Id. at 17. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295 (1942) (holding that federal 
government breached the trust relationship by failing to prevent misappropriation of trust funds by 
tribal treasurer). 
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). 
35. Id. at 556–57. 
36. Id. at 561. 
37. Id. 
38. 187 U.S. 553, 565–68 (1903). 
39. Id. 
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over tribal sovereignty.
40
  Specifically, the Supreme Court characterized the 
―infringement test‖ as follows:  ―[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the 
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.‖41 
B.  Federal and State Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction over Indian Country 
1.  Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Country 
Congress passed several expansive legislative acts that qualified tribal 
sovereignty over criminal jurisdiction in the name of tribal interest and the 
federal trust relationship.
42
  Immediately following the Revolutionary War, 
Congress passed legislation to extend federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in Indian country by non-Indians against Indians ―as part of the 
overall federal policy of providing a buffer between the non-Indian and Indian 
populations.‖43  Subsequently, Congress enacted the General Crimes Act to 
extend federal criminal jurisdiction to cover all crimes in Indian country 
except (1) crimes committed by Indians against Indians, (2) crimes committed 
by Indians who receive punishment by the tribe, and (3) crimes over which a 
treaty gives exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe.
44
  Congress further qualified 
tribal sovereignty over criminal jurisdiction when it passed the Major Crimes 
Act, which expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over seven severe crimes 
committed by Indians against Indians.  Today, the Major Crimes Act extends 
federal criminal jurisdiction over fourteen severe crimes.
45
 
While Congress expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian 
country, the Supreme Court eroded tribal criminal jurisdiction and held that 
tribes have no general criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
46
  The Court 
held that ―[w]hile not conclusive on the issue before us, the commonly shared 
 
40. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
41. Id. 
42. See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). 
43. CANBY, supra note 18, at 133 (citing 1 Stat. 138 (1790); 1 Stat. 743 (1799); 2 Stat. 139 
(1802)). 
44. Id. at 133–34; General Crimes Act, Ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)). 
45. Major Crimes Act, Pub. L. No. 94-297, § 2, 90 Stat. 585 (1976) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)); see also PEVAR, supra note 12, at 78, 389 (The Major Crimes Act originally 
authorized the federal government to prosecute murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, assault with 
intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.  Subsequently Congress amended the Major Crimes Act to 
include incest, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault 
against an individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years, robbery, and theft among others. 
§ 2, 90 Stat. at 585.) 
46. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
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presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that 
tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians carries considerable 
weight.‖47  Accordingly, the Court concluded that ―[b]y submitting to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily 
give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a 
manner acceptable to Congress.‖48 
2.  Civil Jurisdiction over Indian Country 
Although Congress also took numerous measures to qualify tribal 
sovereignty over civil jurisdiction in the name of the federal trust relationship, 
federal and state civil jurisdiction over Indian country seems narrower than 
federal criminal jurisdiction. For instance, state courts lack jurisdiction over 
civil claims made by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
49
  
Similarly, state courts lack civil jurisdiction between tribal members.
50
  
However, Indian tribes lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-Indian 
fee land unless (1) the nonmembers entered into a consensual relationship 
with the tribe or its members or (2) ―conduct threatens or has some direct 
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare 
of the tribe.‖51 Nonetheless, the Indian Commerce Clause grants the federal 
government plenary power over tribes, which includes the power to delegate 
jurisdiction to the states, as demonstrated in Public Law 280.
52
 
C.  Public Law 280: A Federal Grant of Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction to 
States 
Passed in 1953 during the ―Termination Period,‖53 Public Law 280 is 
perhaps the most expansive piece of legislation that qualifies tribal 
sovereignty as it pertains to criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian 
 
47. Id. at 206. 
48. Id. at 210. 
49. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959). 
50. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 388 (1976). 
51. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 (2001); Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
52. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 3 (―Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.‖); Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 
Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1360 (2000) (civil)). 
53. CANBY, supra note 18, at 58 (During the Termination Period, Congress passed legislation 
that served to terminate both the special ―Trust Relationship‖ between the federal government and 
the tribes as well as tribes themselves); see also Emma Garrison, Baffling Distinctions Between 
Criminal and Regulatory: How Public Law 280 Allows Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump 
Tribal Sovereignty, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 449, 451 (2004) (Congress also passed Public Law 
280 ―[i]n order to relieve the strain on federal resources and better address rampant lawlessness in 
Indian country and inadequate tribal courts.‖). 
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country.
54
  On one hand, Public Law 280 states
55
 have jurisdiction to enforce 
their criminal laws inside and outside Indian country.
56
  Specifically, Public 
Law 280 reads: 
 
Each of the States . . . shall have jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian 
country . . . to the same extent that such State or Territory has 
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the 
State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or 
Territory shall have the same force and effect within such 





Consequently, neither the General Crimes Act nor the Major Crimes Act 
applies in Public Law 280 states.
58
 
On the other hand, Public Law 280 states have civil jurisdiction inside and 
outside Indian country.
59
  Specifically, the Public Law 280 reads: 
 
Each of the States listed . . . shall have jurisdiction over civil 
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are 
parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed . . . to 
the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other 
civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that 
are of general application to private persons or private 
property shall have the same force and effect within such 




In Bryan v. Itasca County, the Supreme Court interpreted this statutory 
language to ―authorize[] application by the state courts of their rules of 
decision to decide [civil] disputes‖—in short, Public Law 280 delegated to 
states civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian country.
61
  Despite Public 
 
54. PEVAR, supra note 12, at 122–23. 
55. I will refer to states where Public Law 280 applies as ―Public Law 280 states.‖  I will also 
refer to tribes to whom Public Law 280 applies as ―Public Law 280 tribes.‖  Public Law 280 applies 
in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  Id.  The remaining forty-four 
states received the option of assuming criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes.  Id. at 156. 
56. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89. 
57. § 2(a), 67 Stat. at 588. 
58. § 2(c), 67 Stat. at 589. 
59. § 2, 67 Stat. at 589. 
60. § 4, 67 Stat. at 589. 
61. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 384 (1976).  Nonetheless, Public Law 280 exempts 
three substantive areas from state criminal or civil jurisdiction: (1) ―the state may not tax, encumber, 
or alienate Indian trust property,‖ (2) ―[the state] may not regulate the use of Indian trust property in 
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Law 280, tribes may also exercise civil jurisdiction within Indian country if 
they exercise it in compliance with pertinent federal Indian law.
62
  Taken 
together, Public Law 280 confers two types of jurisdiction to states over 
Indian country—criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory.63  By contrast, 
Public Law 280 did not confer civil/regulatory jurisdiction.
64
 
Unfortunately, whether a Public Law 280 state law applies in Indian 
country seems anything but clear-cut, for the courts have struggled to 
distinguish between criminal/prohibitory and civil/regulatory laws.
65
  
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians explained the distinction as 
follows: 
 
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain 
conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280‘s grant of criminal 
jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct 
at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as 
civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its 
enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is 





Critics argue that the Cabazon test seems ambiguous and subject to 
manipulation because the Court neglects to define the ―conduct at issue.‖67  
Additionally, the test seems amorphous because courts consider public policy 
to construe state legislation that is neither a clear-cut criminal nor civil law.
68
  
Unsurprisingly, state courts that have applied the Cabazon test have reached 
inconsistent results for nearly identical statutes that pertain to traffic laws, 
family laws, and fireworks laws.
69
 
Courts in Public Law 280 states have reached differing results where they 
construe state driving laws because the states regulate some aspects of driving 
 
any manner that conflicts with federal law,‖ and (3) ―the state may not deprive an Indian or tribe of 
federally guaranteed hunting, fishing, or trapping rights and the right to license, control, and regulate 
the same.‖  PEVAR, supra note 12, at 156. 
62. Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559–62 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶ 32, 236 
Wis. 2d 384, ¶ 32, 612 N.W.2d 709, ¶ 32. 
63. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987). 
64. Id. 
65. Timothy J. Droske, Comment, The New Battleground for Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex 
Offender Registration in Indian Country, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 897, 904–05, n.54 (2007). 
66. 480 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added). 
67. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 904–05 n.54 (citing State v. Stone, 572 
N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997)). 
68. Garrison, supra note 53, at 459. 
69. Id. at 459–68. 
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itself, such as licensing and other automobile requirements, while prohibiting 
others, such as dangerous driving.
70
  On one hand, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals has held that ―Minnesota does not prohibit driving, but instead 
generally permits the larger activity of driving, subject to regulatory 
limitations.‖71  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
because Washington amended its traffic code to decriminalize certain traffic 
offenses, provisions applying to speeding constituted a civil/regulatory law 
not enforceable within Indian country.
72
 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
Wisconsin‘s motor vehicle licensing statute served to deter dangerous driving 
and constituted a criminal/prohibitory law.
73
  Likewise, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that traffic offenses constituted criminal/prohibitory law; in 
doing so, the court focused primarily on the definition of traffic laws as 
criminal in the state constitution and prior case law that deemed them 
criminal.
74
  Nonetheless, most Public Law 280 courts have held that state laws 
that serve to deter driving while intoxicated constitute criminal/prohibitory 
laws within the states‘ Public Law 280 jurisdiction.75 
Similar to state driving laws, courts in Public Law 280 states have reached 
differing results where they must construe family law because these laws 
address both the need to protect children as well as the need to regulate child 
custody agreements.
76
  For example, state courts have reached differing 
results where they confront challenges to statutes that address felony injury to 
a child.
77
  On one hand, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that although a 
statute was added to the civil/regulatory laws that protect children, such as 
Idaho‘s Child Protective Act or Parent-Child Relationship Termination Act, 
such a statute constituted a criminal/prohibitory law because it prohibits injury 
to children.
78
  On the other hand, the Northern District Court of California has 
held that the state‘s child welfare statutes constitute civil/regulatory law 
because they generally permit the conduct of parenting.
79
  Further yet, the 
 
70. Id. at 459–65; see also Arthur F. Foerster, Comment, Divisiveness and Delusion: Public 
Law 280 and the Evasive Criminal/Regulatory Distinction, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1344–46 (1999). 
71. Garrison, supra note 53, at 460 (discussing Stone, 557 N.W.2d at 591). 
72. Id. at 460–61 (discussing Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Washington, 
938 F.2d 146, 148–49 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
73. Id. at 461 (discussing St. Germaine v. Cir. Ct. for Vilas County, 938 F.2d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 
1991)). 
74. Id. at 462 (discussing State v. George, 905 P.2d 626, 631 (Idaho 1995)). 
75. Id. at 463–64 (discussing Bray v. Comm‘r of Public Safety, 555 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1996); State v. McCormack, 793 P.2d 682, 686 (Idaho 1990)). 
76. Id. at 465–67. 
77. Id. at 465. 
78. Id. at 465–66 (discussing State v. Marek, 777 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)). 
79. Id. at 466–67 (discussing Doe v. Mann, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). 
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district court departed from the Cabazon test because it believed that tribal 




Courts in Public Law 280 states have similarly construed statutes that 
confront fireworks sales and use as criminal/prohibitory in some states and 
civil/regulatory in other states.
81
  On one hand, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that a California fireworks statute constituted a 
criminal/prohibitory law despite the fact that the California Health and Safety 
Code described the statute as regulatory and the fact that the statutory scheme 
established permits and licensing fees.
82
  On the other hand, a Wisconsin court 
of appeals embraced the argument that because the Wisconsin legislature 
titled the statute that confronted fireworks sales and use as ―Regulation of 
Fireworks‖ and established permits and exceptions, the statute was a 
civil/regulatory law.
83
  The Wisconsin court rejected the state‘s argument that 
the legislature passed the statute to prevent costly forest fire because ―[t]he 
sale of fireworks, for good or bad, does not violate this State‘s public 
policy.‖84  Taken together, these cases show that courts may easily manipulate 
the Cabazon test because the guiding signpost, whether the conduct at issue 
violates state public policy, provides inconsistent results.
85
 
Although few courts have considered whether sex offender registration 
and notification laws are criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory, the 
Wisconsin and Minnesota state supreme courts have agreed that sex offender 
laws are probably criminal/prohibitory laws.
86
  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
has held that a law providing for civil commitment of sexually violent persons 
was a criminal/prohibitory law where Wisconsin prohibited the conduct ―at 
the heart‖ of the law—sex offenses.87  Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has held that Minnesota unequivocally prohibited ―the narrow conduct 
of a predatory offender residing or moving without maintaining a current 
 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 467–68. 
82. Id. at 467 (discussing Quechan Indian Tribes v. McMullen, 984 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
83. Id. at 467–68 (discussing State v. Cutler, No. 94-1464, 1994 WL 656820, at *3 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 22, 1994)). 
84. Id. 
85. Garrison, supra note 53, at 468–69. 
86. See State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Minn. 2007); In re Commitment of Burgess, 2003 
WI 71, ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 19. 
87. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, at ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d at ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d at ¶ 19.  The court also 
noted that the civil commitment laws would also constitute civil/adjudicatory laws because they 
―‗have to do with private rights and status‘ [such as an] adjudication of . . . mental health.‖  Id. at 
¶¶ 20–21 (quoting Daniel H. Israel & Thomas L. Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and 
Economic Development, 49 N.D. L. REV. 267, 296 (1973)). 
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address registration with the appropriate authorities.‖88  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court therefore held that the state requirement that sex offenders 
maintain a current address registration fell within the criminal/prohibitory 
jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 280.
89
 
III.  TRIBES‘ CONCERNS WITH SECTION 127 OF THE AWA 
Part III examines tribes‘ argument that the AWA encroaches upon the 
current federal Indian law policy of promoting tribal sovereignty. Tribes argue 
that section 127 of the AWA encroaches upon the existing federal Indian law 
policy of tribal sovereignty in both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 
states.
90
  In other words, as the National Conference of American Indians 
(―NCAI‖) and its brethren have noted, section 127 is ―an expansion of state 
jurisdiction that will unnecessarily complicate the already confusing system of 
criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands.‖91  Although Congress has plenary power 
to enact legislation such as the AWA and delegate authority to the states,
92
 the 
tribes‘ challenge that the AWA departs from current federal Indian law and 
policy favoring tribal sovereignty is significant because federal Indian law and 
policy has historically shifted as a ―pendulum‖ between overregulation in the 
name of the federal trust relationship and promoting tribal sovereignty.
93
  
Consequently, any departure from current federal Indian policy may indicate 
an unwanted shift in federal Indian law and policy away from tribal 
sovereignty and toward assimilation or oppression.
94
 
Subpart A suggests that the AWA threatens tribal sovereignty in non-
Public Law 280 states because the AWA may retrocede sex offender 
registration and notification responsibilities to the state, where non-Public 
Law 280 tribes fail to comply with the AWA‘s requirements.  Subpart B 
recognizes, however, that section 127 does not extend beyond the scope of 
criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction delegated to states 
 
88. Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 7–8. 
89. Id. at 8. 
90. See NCAI Resolution, supra note 7.  Additionally tribes have urged that the AWA departed 
from the federal Indian policy of ―self-determination‖ because it does not allow tribes to assume 
responsibility for sex offender registration as they develop the capacity and resources to do so.  Nat‘l 
Cong. of Am. Indians, Urgent Action Needed: One Month Until the Adam Walsh Act Deadline! 
(2007), available at http://ncai.org/fileadmin/governance/07_036_AdamWalshAct_1_.pdf. 
91. NCAI Resolution, supra note 7. 
92. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. (―Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.‖); Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–68 (1903). 
93. See EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS 
11–12 (1989)); PEVAR, supra note 12, at 4 (citing ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAW, at vi–vii (3d ed. 1991)). 
94. See PEVAR, supra note 12, at 13–14. 
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over Public Law 280 tribes, where courts construe the AWA registration 
provisions as a criminal/prohibitory law.  Nonetheless, subpart B suggests that 
the federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause challenges to the 
AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law, does support 
Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends beyond the scope of 
jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280. 
A.  Non-Public Law 280 Tribes’ Challenge to Section 127 of the AWA 
Non-Public Law 280 tribes challenge that section 127 of the AWA 
threatens to encroach upon existing tribal sovereignty where it requires tribes 
to retrocede its sex offender registration and notification responsibilities 
where tribes fail to implement them.
95
  At the outset, section 127 allows non-
Public Law 280 tribes to elect to carry out sex offender registration and 
notification functions.
96
  However, section 127 delegates to the Attorney 
General the authority to retrocede these functions to the state in which the 
tribe resides, where a non-Public Law 280 tribe cannot ―substantially 
implement‖ the requirements after electing to do so.97 Nonetheless, section 
127 permits a non-Public Law 280 tribe to delegate its responsibilities to 
another jurisdiction in which the tribe is located where it believes it cannot 
carry out the registration and notification responsibilities.
98
 
Digging deeper, non-Public Law 280 tribes‘ challenge to section 127 
seems even more persuasive because non-Public Law 280 tribes appear 
unable to finance independent registration and notification programs.
99
  The 
AWA allocates funds for registration and notification programs on the basis 
of performance and compliance—awarding supplemental funds for 
compliance and reductions for failure.
100
  The AWA therefore disparately 
impacts tribes unable to comply solely upon their own funds because tribal 
 
95. Deer, supra note 9.  The AWA created the ―SMART Office,‖ which ―administers the 
national standards for sex offender registration and assists the states with questions throughout the 
implementation process.‖ Lara Geer Farley, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-
First Century, 47 WASHBURN L. J. 471, 483 n.102 (2008); see also The National Guidelines for Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,210, 30,211 (May 30, 2007) (proposed 
guidelines). 
96. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 127(a), 120 
Stat. 587, 599–600 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16927(a)). 
97. Id. § 127(a)(2)(C). 
98. Id. § 127(a)(1)(B). 
99. See NCAI Resolution, supra note 7; Deer, supra note 9; Jerry Reynolds, Sovereignty Issues 
Plague Adam Walsh Act, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Apr. 2, 2008, at A3; Jodi Rave, Tribal Leaders 
Testify to Congress on Mandate to Register Sex Offenders, THE MISSOULIAN, July 18, 2008, 
available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2008/07/18/jodirave/rave46.prt; John Gramlich, 
States to Enforce Molester Law on Tribal Land , May 15, 2008, 
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=309820. 
100. § 125(b)(4), 120 Stat at 587, 599 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(4)). 
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justice systems have long suffered from inadequate funding.
101
  Additionally, 
many tribes have not previously participated in sex offender registration and 
notification programs, so non-Public Law 280 tribes may require more 
resources and technical support as compared to states.
102
  Non-Public Law 280 
tribes also seem ―ill-prepared to compete with more sophisticated applicants 
in a competitive grant process.‖103  In sum, historically inadequate tribal 
justice system funding, inexperience, and steep competition for federal 
funding renders the AWA a potential encroachment upon tribal sovereignty in 
non-Public Law 280 states.
104
 
B.  Public Law 280 Tribes’ Challenge to Section 127 of the AWA 
Public Law 280 tribes challenge that section 127 of the AWA extends 
jurisdiction to states beyond the Public Law 280 delegation of 
criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction.  Applying the Public 
Law 280 jurisprudence laid forth by the Wisconsin and Minnesota supreme 
courts, which construes sex offender legislation as a criminal/prohibitory law, 
section 127 does not extend beyond the scope of criminal/prohibitory and 
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280.  
Nonetheless, the federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause 
challenges to the AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law, 
does support Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends 
beyond the scope of jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280. 
1.  Applying Public Law 280 Jurisprudence to the AWA Registration 
Provisions 
Public Law 280 tribes challenge that section 127 of the AWA threatens to 
encroach upon tribal sovereignty because it automatically delegates to states 
the authority to carry out sex offender registration and notification functions 
 
101. Maria Odum, Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
1991, at B.16. 
Odum writes: 
 
The disparities between most courts in the country and Indian tribal courts have 
long been conceded, but there is increasing concern among American Indians, 
civil rights officials and some members of Congress that these disparities, 
caused in large part by inadequate financial support, are depriving litigants in 
the tribal system of their civil rights. 
Id. 
102. Letter from Joe Garcia, NCAI President, to Laura Rogers, Director of SMART Office, 
U.S. Dept. of Justice (June 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/documents/governance/Adam_Walsh_Act/grant_letter.pdf. 
103. Id. 
104. NCAI Resolution, supra note 7. 
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for Public Law 280 tribes.
105
  Section 127 does not permit Public Law 280 
tribes to ―elect‖ to carry out registration and notification functions.106  Instead, 
section 127 treats Public Law 280 tribes as if they 
 
[E]lect[ed] to delegate [their] functions under this subtitle to 
another jurisdiction or jurisdictions within which the territory 
of the tribe is located and to provide access to its territory and 
such other cooperation and assistance as may be needed to 
enable such other jurisdiction or jurisdictions to carry out and 




Public Law 280 tribes‘ challenge to section 127 depends on whether the 
AWA registration and notification laws constitute civil/regulatory or 
criminal/prohibitory laws.
108
  However, based on the two Wisconsin and 
Minnesota supreme court decisions addressing sex offender registration laws 
as applied within Indian country,
109
 section 127 seems to extend state 
criminal/prohibitory jurisdiction over tribes consistent with Public Law 
280.
110
  More specifically, because federal law prohibits the type of sexual 
conduct at the heart of the AWA, the AWA would appear criminal/prohibitory 
under Wisconsin law.
111
  Similarly, because the federal law prohibits ―the 
narrow conduct of a predatory offender residing or moving without 
maintaining a current address registration with the appropriate authorities,‖ 
the AWA appears criminal/prohibitory under Minnesota law.
112
 
Additionally, section 127 of the AWA perhaps allows Public Law 280 
tribes and states to establish cooperative agreements to carry out the 
registration and notification functions, and this provision defends, albeit to a 
limited extent, against critics‘ claims that the Act encroaches upon tribal 
sovereignty.
113
  In particular, cooperative agreements seem consistent with the 
 
105. Id.; Deer, supra note 9; Rave, supra note 99; Reynolds, supra note 99. 
106. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
§ 127(a)(2)(A), 120 Stat. 587, 600 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16927(a)(2)(A)). 
107. § 127(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat. at 600. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 53–64. 
109.  State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Minn. 2007); In re Commitment of Burgess, 2003 WI 
71, ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 19. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 65–89. 
111. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 102, 120 
Stat. 587, 590 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901); Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d 
354, ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 19 . Nonetheless, I dismiss arguments that the AWA would constitute a 
civil/adjudicatory law because, unlike civil commitment proceedings, sex offender registration laws 
seem more akin to taxing and franchising than to ―private rights and status.‖  Burgess, 2003 WI 71, 
¶ 20, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶ 20, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 20 (citing Israel & Smithson, supra note 87, at 296). 
112. Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 7–8. 
113. Section 127(b)(2) states that: 
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widely shared belief that Public Law 280 did not deprive Public Law 280 
tribes and their courts of concurrent jurisdiction over civil matters.
114
  
Nonetheless, section 127, as written, does not require Public Law 280 states to 
enter into cooperative agreements with tribes.
115
 
2.  Applying Ex Post Facto Clause Doctrine to the AWA Registration 
Provisions 
a.  Ex Post Facto Clause Doctrine 
Article I, Section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution states, ―No 
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.‖116  Primarily, the Ex 
Post Facto Clause prohibits Congress and the states from passing any law 
―which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time 
it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then 
prescribed.‖117  Legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause where two 
elements are present: (1) the legislation must apply retroactively, and (2) the 
legislation must disadvantage the retrospective offender.
118
  In other words, ―if 
a statute merely alters penal provisions . . . it violates the Clause if it is both 
retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the 
offense.‖119 
Courts that apply the Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine should determine 
whether the legislature, by passing a statute, intended to establish ―‗civil‘ 
proceedings.‖120  Legislative intent to impose punishment after the fact is a 
 
 
A tribe may, through cooperative agreements with such a jurisdiction or 
jurisdictions— 
(A) arrange for the tribe to carry out any function of such a jurisdiction  
under this subtitle with respect to sex offenders subject to the tribe‘s 
jurisdiction; and 
(B) arrange for such a jurisdiction to carry out any function of the tribe 
under this subtitle with respect to sex offenders subject to the tribe‘s 
jurisdiction. 
120 Stat. at 600. 
114. Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559–62 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶ 32, 236 
Wis. 2d 384, ¶ 32 , 612 N.W.2d 709, ¶ 32. 
115. § 127(b)(2), 120 Stat. at 600. 
116. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3. 
117. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 277, 325–26 (1867)). 
118. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29–30. 
119. Id. at 30–31. 
120. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).  The Supreme Court seems to 
characterize civil and criminal ―proceedings‖ more generally than state courts that decide Public Law 
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prima facie Ex Post Facto Clause violation.
121
  By contrast, if the legislature 
intended to impose a civil and nonpunitive regulatory scheme, then a statute 
constitutes an Ex Post Facto Clause violation where it is ―‗so punitive either 
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State‘s] intention‘ to deem it ‗civil.‘‖122 
Courts consider seven factors to analyze the effects of a law: 
 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment,
 
[3] whether it comes into play only on a finding 
of scienter,
 
[4] whether its operation will promote the 
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, 
[5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime,
 
[6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it,
 
and [7] whether it 





Courts must defer to legislative intent, and ―‗only the clearest proof‘ will 
suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated 
a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.‖124  Ultimately, the Ex Post Facto 




Recently, the United States Supreme Court applied the Ex Post Facto 
Clause doctrine to Alaska‘s state sex offender registration laws and 
determined that the registration laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.
126
  To begin, the Court determined that the Alaska legislature intended 
the sex offender registration laws to impose a civil, nonpunitive regulatory 
scheme.
127
  Subsequently, the Court determined that Alaska‘s civil and 
nonpunitive sex offender registration laws were not ―so punitive‖ in either 
purpose or effect to negate Alaska‘s legislative intent.128 
 
280 jurisdictional disputes.  Therefore, the Court‘s use of the term ―proceedings‖ does not seem to 
overlap with Public Law 280‘s delegation of civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction.  Id.; see also In re 
Commitment of Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶¶ 20–21, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶¶ 20–21, 665 N.W.2d 124, 
¶¶ 20–21 (explaining civil/adjudicatory proceedings). 
121. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
122. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980)). 
123. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (emphasis omitted). 
124. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 
(1997)). 
125. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). 
126. Id. at 84, 106. 
127. Id. at 96. 
128. Id. at 97–106. 
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b.  The AWA Sex Offender Registration Provisions 
The AWA, through the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA) provisions, requires sex offenders to register and notify local 
authorities where the sex offender moves interstate into another community.
129
 
Specifically, the AWA requires ―a sex offender [to] register, and keep the 
registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the 
offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.‖130  
Additionally, the AWA increases the punishment to up to ten years 
imprisonment for sex offenders who (1) are required to register, (2) travel in 
interstate commerce, and (3) knowingly fail to register or update 
registration.
131
  Finally, the AWA delegates the Attorney General authority: 
 
[T]o specify the applicability of the requirements of this title 
to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this Act 
[enacted July 27, 2006] or its implementation in a particular 
jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any 
such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders 





Criminal defendants have challenged that applying the AWA 
retrospectively for failing to register as a sex offender between July 27, 2006, 
when Congress passed the AWA, and February 28, 2007, when the Attorney 
General declared that the AWA applied retroactively to sex offenders 




129. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 112–113, 
120 Stat. 587, 593–94 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16912–13). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at ch. 109B, sec. 2250, § 141, 120 Stat. at 601–02 (to be codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2250). 
132. Id. § 113(d).  The Attorney General exercised his authority to apply the AWA 
retrospectively on February 28, 2007.  Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 
(2007). 
133. See United States v. Natividad-Garcia, 560 F. Supp. 2d 561 (W.D. Tex. 2008); United 
States v. Gillette, 553 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D. Virgin Islands 2008); United States v. Ditomasso, 552 F. 
Supp. 2d 233 (D.R.I. 2008); United States v. Madera, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2007) 
overruled, in part, by United States v. Madera 528 F.3d 852, 859 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Gill, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (D. Utah 2007); United States v. Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d 560 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2007); United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747 (W.D. Va. 2007); United States v. Akers, No. 
3:07-CR-00086(01) RM, 2008 WL 914493 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2008); United States v. Dixon, No. 
3:07-CR-72(01) RM 2007, WL 4553720 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2007); United States v. Elliott, No. 07-
14059-CR, 2007 WL 4365599 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2007); United States v. Adkins, No. 1:07 -CR-59, 
2007 WL 4335457 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2007); United States v. Cardenas, No. 07-80108-CR, 2007 WL 
4245913 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2007); United States v. Howell, No. CR07-2013-MWB, 2007 WL 
3302547 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 8, 2007); United States v. Beasley, No. 1:07-CR-115-TCB, 2007 WL 
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Although one federal appellate court has attempted to provide guidance,
134
 
federal district courts have responded to Ex Post Facto Clause challenges in 
two ways. First, federal district courts have focused on the section 2250 
provision that increased punishment for failing to register, distinguished these 
provisions from the Alaska registration laws in Smith, and held that the AWA 
provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
135
  Second, federal district courts 
have focused on the section 16912 registration provision, recognized that 
these provisions compare to the Alaska registration laws, and held that the 
AWA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
136
 
c.  Reconsidering Public Law 280 Tribes’ Challenge 
The federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause challenges to 
the AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law, supports 
Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends beyond the scope of 
jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280.  Although the 
Wisconsin and Minnesota supreme courts have interpreted sex offender 
registration laws as criminal/prohibitory law under Public Law 280 
jurisprudence,
137
 the Supreme Court and federal district courts have 
interpreted the AWA sex offender registration laws as civil law under Ex Post 
Facto Clause doctrine.
138
  In other words, courts have interpreted the AWA 
registration provisions differently under Public Law 280 jurisprudence than 
Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine. 
Nonetheless, the Cabazon test and subsequent Public Law 280 
jurisprudence seems less reliable than the Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine.  In 
particular, the ―Seven Factor Analysis‖ seems to parse out the distinction 
 
3489999 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2007); United States v. Deese, No. CR-07-167-L, 2007 WL 2778362 
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2007); United States v. Muzio, No. 4:07CR179 CDP, 2007 WL 2159462 (E.D. 
Mo. July 26, 2007); United States v. Templeton, No. Cr-06-291-M, 2007 WL 445481 (W.D. Okla. 
Feb. 7, 2007). 
134. Madera, 528 F.3d at 859 (holding that the AWA does not apply to defendants who 
became sex offenders prior to July 27, 2006, and failed to register prior to February 28, 2007).  
However, the Eleventh Circuit passed on Madera‘s general Ex Post Facto Clause challenge.  Id. 
135. See generally Natividad-Garcia, 560 F. Supp. 2d 561; Gillette, 553 F. Supp. 2d 524; Gill, 
520 F. Supp. 2d 1341; Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d 560; Howell, 2007 WL 3302547; Beasley, 2007 WL 
3489999; Deese, 2007 WL 2778362; Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462. 
136. See generally Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 223; Akers, 2008 WL 914493; Madera, 474 
F. Supp. 2d 1257; Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747; Dixon, 2007 WL 4553720; Elliott, 2007 WL 
4365599; Adkins, 2007 WL 4335457; Cardenas, 2007 WL 4245913; Templeton, 2007 WL 445481. 
137. Again, I dismiss arguments that the AWA would constitute a civil/adjudicatory law 
because, unlike civil commitment proceedings, sex offender registration laws seem more akin to 
taxing and franchising than to ―private rights and status‖ such as an ―adjudication of . . . mental 
health.‖  In re Commitment of  Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶¶ 20–21, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶¶ 20–21, 665 
N.W.2d 124, ¶¶ 20–21 (2003) (citing Israel & Smithson, supra note 87, at 296). 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 116–36. 
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between criminal/prohibitory and civil/regulatory laws.
139
  Although the 
―Seven Factor Analysis‖ focuses on whether a law imposes ex post facto 
punishment, four of the factors could implicitly examine whether a state law 
is criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory: (2) whether it has historically been 
regarded as a punishment,
 
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter,
 
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence, and (5) whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime.
140
  These relevant factors, as well as the 
well-developed area of statutory construction and interpretation applied in 
Smith, also seem more concrete than the vague ―conduct at issue‖ inquiry 
established in Cabazon.
141
  Consequently, although the Ex Post Facto Clause 
has no legal connection to Public Law 280 jurisprudence,
142
 the federal courts 
have provided implicit support to reconsider Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument 
that the AWA registration and notification laws encroach upon tribal 
sovereignty by unilaterally delegating a civil/regulatory responsibility to 
Public Law 280 states. 
IV.  AMENDING SECTION 127 OF THE AWA TO RESIST ENCROACHING UPON 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Part IV proposes that because the AWA threatens the tribal sovereignty of 
both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes, Congress should amend 
section 127 of the AWA to require tribe and state cooperative agreements to 
carry out the sex offender registration and notification functions.  Subpart A 
recognizes that Congress has previously enacted legislation that requires 
tribes and states to enter into cooperative agreements to regulate activity in 
Indian country—the IGRA.  Despite confronting similar objections to 
amending section 127, Congress again should resolve tribe and state 
jurisdictional conflict with legislation requiring cooperation between tribes 
and states to carry out sex offender registration and notification. 
Subpart B suggests that amending section 127 to require tribe and state 
cooperative agreements would promote effective sex offender registration 
programs tailored to fit the needs of each tribe.  Subpart C similarly suggests 
that amending section 127 to require tribe and state cooperative agreements 
 
139. Supra text accompanying notes 116–36 
140. See supra text accompanying note 123 for the ―Seven Factor Analysis.‖ 
141. Compare Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92–106 (2003) with California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); see also supra text accompanying notes 65–85 
(discussing the ambivalence of the Cabazon test to address various state laws). 
142. Nonetheless, courts should continuously strive for consistency in law.  See Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 (1991) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 
(1989), and noting that courts may depart from precedent where it becomes a ―detriment to 
coherence and consistency in the law‖). 
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would promote current federal Indian law and policy favoring tribal 
sovereignty. 
A.  Following the Footsteps of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
Congress has previously required tribes and states to adopt cooperative 
agreements where courts have held that states may not regulate certain 
conduct within Indian country—gaming.143  In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Butterworth, the Fifth Circuit first identified that gaming was a Public Law 
280 jurisdictional conflict and held that a state could interfere with tribal 
gaming where the state generally prohibited gaming rather than merely 
regulated it.
144
  States responded to gaming profits throughout the 1980s with 
resentment,
145
 and the United States Supreme Court finally confronted gaming 
under Public Law 280 in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.
146
  
Nonetheless, the Court relied upon the criminal/prohibitory versus 
civil/regulatory dichotomy and held that California could not enforce local 
ordinances against the tribe‘s gaming operations.147 
Congress responded to the Cabazon decision by passing the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act,
148
 which requires states and tribes to enter into 
gaming compacts where the tribe seeks to conduct certain gaming.
149
  The 
IGRA expressly states the following findings in support of federal regulation 
of Indian gaming: 
 
 
143. See PEVAR, supra note 12, at 320. 
144. 658 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1981). ―Other federal courts followed the Fifth Circuit‘s lead 
on this issue and analyzed attempted state interference with Indian bingo under the 
regulation/prohibition dichotomy.‖  Daniel Twetten, Public Law 280 and the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act: Could Two Wrongs Ever Be Made into a Right?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1317, 1339 (2000) (citing Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 
F.2d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1982); Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712, 712 (W.D. 
Wis. 1981)). 
145. Twetten, supra note 144, at 1340; see also 131 CONG. REC. S4124 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1985) 
(statement of Rep. DeConcini); 131 CONG. REC. E2004 (daily ed. May 8, 1985) (statement of Rep. 
Shumway); 131 CONG. REC. S4124 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1985) (statement of Rep. DeConcini); 131 
CONG. REC. E3060-61 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Rep. Shumway). 
146. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
147. Id. at 211, 214. 
148. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 
25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000)). 
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166; 25 U.S.C. § 2710 et seq; PEVAR, supra note 12, at 320; see also 
Twetten, supra note 144, at 1340 (―Cabazon capped a decade of significant victories in federal court 
for Indians hoping to catch the gaming gravy train.  Congress took control of that train, however, in 
the year following Cabazon when it passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.‖); 133 CONG. REC. 
S15802-03 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Hecht) (recognizing that Congress responded  
to the Cabazon decision by introducing the IGRA). 
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(1) [N]umerous Indian tribes have become engaged in or have 
licensed gaming activities on Indian lands as a means of 
generating tribal governmental revenue; 
(2) Federal courts have held that section 2103 of the Revised 
Statutes (25 U.S.C. 81) requires Secretarial review of 
management contracts dealing with Indian gaming, but does 
not provide standards for approval of such contracts; 
(3) [E]xisting Federal law does not provide clear standards or 
regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands; 
(4) [A] principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote 
tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and 
strong tribal government; and 
(5) Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming 
activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not 
specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted 
within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and 




In short, Congress stepped in post-Cabazon to resolve the Public Law 280 
jurisdictional conflict between states and tribes over gaming regulation. 
Accordingly, Congress should again opt to require cooperative agreements 
and therefore resolve the jurisdictional tension between states and tribes over 
sex offender registration and notification responsibilities in favor of tribal 
sovereignty.  Congress should find that numerous Public Law 280 Indian 
tribes have become engaged in or have sex offender registration and 
notification.
151
  Congress should also find that the AWA does not provide 
clear or effective standards or regulations for delegating sex offender 
registration and notification responsibilities between non-Public Law 280 and 
Public Law 280 tribes and states.
152
  Congress should find that a principal goal 
of federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal 
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government, and tribes may have financial 
difficulty implementing sex offender registration and notification systems.
153
  
Finally, Congress should find that Indian tribes may have the right to regulate 
sex offender registration and notification on Indian lands where sex offender 
registration is a civil/regulatory law.
154
 
Both tribes and states may resist amending the AWA to require 
cooperative agreements for similar reasons as the tribes and states that resisted 
 
150. § 2, 102 Stat. at 2467. 
151. See, e.g., Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 913–28. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 90–104. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 99–104. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 105–42. 
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IGRA.  First, Public Law 280 states may argue that Public Law 280 
jurisprudence delegates AWA registration and notification functions to the 
state as criminal prohibitory laws.
155
  Conversely, both non-Public Law 280 
and Public Law 280 tribes may argue that the AWA would encroach upon 
tribal sovereignty by requiring tribes to enter into cooperative agreements, 
rather than recognizing a tribe‘s right to carry out the AWA registration and 
notification responsibilities independently.
156
  Both these arguments, however, 
seem unpersuasive because of the demonstrated value of cooperative 
agreements between Public Law 280 tribes and states to carry out sex offender 
registration and notification functions.
157
 
Second, the U.S. Justice Department ―SMART‖ office158 may argue that 
allowing Public Law 280 tribes and states to establish cooperative agreements 
to carry out registration and notification functions would create an enormous 
amount of varied systems and make monitoring and enforcing the AWA 
standards impossible.
159
  This argument also seems unpersuasive because the 
AWA permits states, territories, and non-Public Law 280 tribes to establish 
varied systems that comply with the Attorney General‘s guidelines.160 
Despite resistance from tribes, states, and the United States Justice 
Department, Congress should follow the footsteps of the IGRA and consider 
amending section 127 of the AWA to (1) strike provisions that unilaterally 
delegate sex offender registration and notification responsibilities to the states 
and (2) require that both non-Public law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes and 
states adopt cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration and 
notification programs that comply with the AWA. To enforce section 127, 
Congress could also amend section 125,
161
 which enables the SMART office 
to allocate funds for registration and notification programs on the basis of 
 
155. One argument against passing the IGRA was that the states were appealing the Cabazon 
decision to the United States Supreme Court and the IGRA seemed inconsistent with the state‘s 
position on Public Law 280 jurisprudence.  See 132 CONG. REC. 1421 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1986) 
(statement of Rep. Shumway).  Here, states would rely on the Wisconsin and Minnesota supreme 
court decisions construing sex offender legislation as criminal/prohibitory laws.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 86–89. 
156. One argument against passing the IGRA was that it would limit tribes‘ inherent right to 
regulate gaming free of state interference. See 131 CONG. REC. E1315 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985) 
(statement of Rep. Udall) (recognizing tribe‘s inherent right to regulate gaming free of state 
interference). 
157. See infra text accompanying notes 162–76. 
158. See supra note 95. 
159. One argument against passing the IGRA was that it ―could result in 50 different sets of 
regulations, which would be impossible to monitor or enforce.‖  132 CONG. REC. E1086-87 (daily 
ed. Apr. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Vucanovich). 
160. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 112, 120 
Stat. 587, 593 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16912). 
161. Id. § 125, 120 Stat. at 599 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16925). 
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performance and compliance, to allocate funding for tribes and states that 
enter into cooperative agreements and establish sex offender registration and 
notification systems that comply with the AWA. 
B.  Establishing Custom-Fit Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Programs that Comply with the AWA 
Amending section 127 would encourage tribes and states to develop 
―custom-fit‖ sex offender registration and notification programs that comply 
with AWA. From the outset, ―scholars and commentators have touted the 
value of tribal-state compacts over rigid divisions between tribal and State 
sovereignty.‖162  Specifically, tribe and state cooperative agreements have 
immense value when dealing with sex offender registration and notification 
duties for two primary reasons: (1) states and tribes have the common goal of 
providing protection from sex offenders, and (2) no ―one-size-fits-all‖ 
solution exists.
163
  The first reason seems self-explanatory—because both 
tribes and states have a common interest in protecting the public from sex 
offenders, tribes and states should combine efforts to establish sex offender 
registration programs.
164
  The second reason seems more complex yet equally 
persuasive; in particular, cooperative agreements allow states and tribes to 
accommodate for variables such as size, location, wealth, and interaction with 
local enforcement agencies, as well as culture and philosophy.
165
 
The experience of Minnesota provides a recent example of the benefit of 
tribe and state cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration 
programs.
166
  Minnesota entered into a range of cooperative agreements with 
tribes to fill the gap left by State v. Jones, which initially declared 
Minnesota‘s sex offender registration and notification laws did not apply in 
Indian country because they were civil/regulatory laws.
167
  On one hand, 
Minnesota established a cooperative agreement with the White Earth Nation 
and allowed the tribe to exercise maximum tribal sovereignty by regulating 
and enforcing its own registration and notification code with tribal police and 
courts.
168
  On the other hand, Minnesota established a cooperative agreement 
 
162. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 916. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 916 n.105 (referring to Doreen Hagen, State Should Work Together with Tribal 
Governments, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 7, 2005, at 11B). 
165. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 916–19. 
166. Id. 
167. State v. Jones, 700 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Droske, New Battleground, 
supra note 65, at 916–19. 
168. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 923 nn.149–50 (quoting White Earth 
Reservation: Tribe Signs Predatory Offender’s Code, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Sept. 8, 2005, at B2) 
(―The tribe viewed its predatory offender registration law as a powerful expression of the White 
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with the Leech Lake tribe that mirrored the state‘s criminal/prohibitory 
jurisdiction and allowed Minnesota to carry out registration and notification 
functions.
169
  One pragmatic reason why the Leech Lake tribe chose this plan 
was its inability to enforce the regulations independently.
170
  Finally, 
Minnesota established cooperative agreements with the Shakopee and Grand 
Portage tribes that combined notions of tribal sovereignty with state resources 
and expertise.
171
  These cooperative agreements stated that Minnesota would 
enforce its own registration and notification requirements in the event that the 
offender failed to follow tribal registration rules.
172
 
In short, the experience of Minnesota and its tribes reveals that 
cooperative agreements between tribes and states are a vital option to 
establishing sex offender registration programs that both satisfy the AWA and 
meet the varying needs of tribes.
173
  In turn, states benefit from the knowledge 
of tribal leaders as to how best to carry out the program within tribes.
174
  As 
critics of the AWA have suggested, ―To effectively monitor sex offenders 
within tribal communities, the tribal governments must be involved.‖175  Laura 
L. Rogers, the U.S. Justice Department director of the SMART office, has 
agreed: ―[W]hether you represent a tribe, you represent a local entity or you 
represent your state . . . we all need to work together in this effort.‖176 
C.  Promoting Current Federal Indian Law Policy of Promoting Tribal 
Sovereignty 
Amending section 127 would also promote the current federal Indian law 
policy of promoting tribal sovereignty.  Critics of Public Law 280 have 
contended that the delegation of jurisdiction constitutes a ―unilateral 
imposition of jurisdiction over tribes [that] severely infringes upon tribal 
 
Earth Nation‘s ‗inherent sovereignty,‘ and felt the statute would ‗preserve the peace, harmony, and 
safety‘ of the White Earth community, and effectively ‗register and prosecute predatory 
offenders.‘‖). 
169.  Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65 at 925–26 (―[S]ince members of the tribal 
government believed that the State had done an excellent job in implementing its registration laws 
and did not want to water down the law‘s effectiveness by reducing the criminal penalties from a 
felony to a misdemeanor, the tribe chose to turn enforcement back to the State.‖). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 927. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 928 (―The collaborative relationship the tribes and the Attorney General have 
entered into, and the solutions as a result of these collaborative negotiations, serve as an important 
model for other States and tribes that have not yet confronted this issue.‖). 
174. Deer, supra note 9. 
175. Id. 
176. Gramlich, supra note 99. 
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sovereignty . . . inconsistent with current federal policy.‖177  From the 
beginning, tribes have opposed Congress‘s decision to delegate criminal and 
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction to states without their consent—the decision 
blatantly infringed on tribal sovereignty.
178
  Consequently, amending section 
127 to reflect the position that AWA registration and notification provisions 
are civil/regulatory laws promotes tribal sovereignty and self-government.
179
 
Additionally, construing the AWA sex offender registration provisions as 
civil/regulatory laws would promote tribal sovereignty by promoting tribe-
state cooperative agreements.
180
  As Robert Bohn, lawyer for the Leech Lake 
Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota, mentioned at the Federal Bar conference, ―Far 
from being an abdication of tribal sovereignty, we believe this was an 
extension of our cooperative law enforcement agreement and was the ultimate 
expression of government-to-government relations.‖181 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Since July 27, 2006, Indian tribes have challenged that the AWA departs 
from current federal Indian law and policy favoring tribal sovereignty.  On 
one hand, non-Public Law 280 tribes concede that the AWA delegates sex 
offender registration and notification responsibilities to tribes.  However, non-
Public Law 280 tribes challenge that the financial obstacles to establishing a 
sex offender registration and notification programs, coupled with the threat of 
retrocession for failure to comply, constitutes a de facto
182
 delegation of sex 
offender registration and notification responsibilities to the states.  Therefore, 
although the AWA does not purport to encroach upon non-Public Law 280 
tribes‘ sovereignty, it threatens to encroach severely upon tribal sovereignty 
unless tribal registration and notification programs receive funding at the 
outset. 
On the other hand, Public Law 280 tribes argue that the AWA departs 
from the current Public Law 280 delegation of criminal/prohibitory and 
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction where it delegates sex offender registration and 
 
177. Garrison, supra note 53, at 451. 
178. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation 
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 543 (1975); see also WILLIAM A. BROPHY & SOPHIE D. ABERLE, 
THE INDIAN: AMERICA‘S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 186 (1966) (Even President Eisenhower lamented 
that Congress‘s decision to pass Public Law 280 without Indian tribes‘ consent gave him ―grave 
doubts.‖). 
179. See generally NCAI Resolution, supra note 7; Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65. 
180. See generally NCAI Resolution, supra note 7; Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65. 
181. Indianz.com, Tribes Face Deadline to Join National Sex Offender Registry (Apr. 30, 
2007), http://www.indianz.com/News/2007/002661.asp (emphasis added). 
182. ―Actual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally or legally recognized.‖  
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004). 
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notification responsibilities to the states.  Although the Wisconsin and 
Minnesota supreme courts suggest otherwise, the Public Law 280 tribes‘ 
argument has some merit, for federal district courts have rejected criminal 
defendants‘ Ex Post Facto Clause challenges by construing the AWA 
registration provision as civil laws, not criminal laws. 
Taken together, Congress should consider amending section 127 of the 
AWA to (1) strike provisions that unilaterally delegate sex offender 
registration and notification responsibilities to the states and (2) require that 
both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes and states adopt 
cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration and notification 
programs that comply with the AWA. Congress has previously required tribes 
and states to adopt cooperative agreements where courts have held that states 
may not regulate certain conduct within Indian country—gaming. 
Additionally, amending section 127 would both allow tribes and states to 
establish custom-fit agreements to carry out the sex offender registration and 
notification functions and promote current federal Indian law and policy 
favoring tribal sovereignty. Ultimately, Congress‘s decision to amend section 
127 would resist implicit efforts to swing the federal Indian law and policy 





183. See EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS 
11–12 (1989); PEVAR, supra note 12, at 4 (citing ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAW vi–vii (3d ed. 1991)). 
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